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ICHAEL STOLBERG PRODUCES A NUMBER OF EXAMPLES of sixteenth-and early seventeenth-century anatomists who argued for sexual dimorphism on the basis of differences in the skeletons and the genitals of men and women. These he takes as evidence that "the new anatomy of sexual difference emerged in the sixteenth century" and that therefore what I called the "one-sex model" collapsed well before the various philosophical, political, and cultural changes of the Enlightenment to which I attribute the ascendancy of a "two-sex model." The Renaissance and Reformation-not the Age of Reason-he concludes, changed how the West understood sexual difference and introduced a regime in which gender relations were said to be grounded in biological dimorphism. In responding, I will leave the question of bones to Londa Schiebinger and concentrate on the flesh myself.
Stolberg and I do not differ about the existence of claims for sexual dimorphism before the eighteenth century or about the rejection by earlier anatomists of what I construe as anatomical evidence for the one-sex model: the Galenic isomorphisms between penis and vagina, scrotum and uterus, for example. Various scholars have already pointed to these apparent precursors, and I myself wrote at some length about Realdus Columbus's "discovery" of the clitoris, the "female yard," that, one might have thought, would have shaken the foundations of the old view as much as the other Columbus's voyages unsettled European views more generally. But this did not happen; and, similarly, the cases Stolberg offers had minimal impact. Since all his examples make essentially the same point, a detailed examination of one of them should give us a fair indication of just how little interpretive weight they can bear as an ensemble.
Consider the argument of Andre du Laurens, a late sixteenth-century doctor who earned a niche in the history of medicine as a pioneer in the study of scrofula and who published a much reprinted and translated anatomy textbook. Stolberg quotes him as follows: "no similarity comes in between the vagina and the male penis; none between the uterus and the scrotum; neither in the structure, form and size of the testicles the same, nor in the distribution and insertion of the spermatic vessels." "Sense and reason, which are the instruments of philosophers," Du Laurens argues, make it clear that women are not, and could not be, anatomically inverted men.
1 The penis has three cavities, the vagina only one (not exactly the most obvious argument to us post-Freudian readers); the penis has a thin smooth surface, the vagina a thick and rugged one. I might add that he also points out that men have a prostate (a discovery credited to Herophilus back in the fourth century B.C.E.), while women have none. The clitoris is not, and could not be, a version of the penis either: it is small and the penis is large; the penis has a passage for urine and semen, the clitoris has none.
Du Laurens scores the occasional rhetorical point of the "How can a body with three cavities become a body with one cavity?" sort. He proffers a healthy skepticism about the possibility of girls changing into boys by having genitals that had been inside drop out. But otherwise it is very much business as usual in the one-sex world: both sexes, he says, have testicles; women have four preparatory vessels for their semen just like men, even if these are distributed differently; they have spermatic arteries and veins; conception happens with the confluence of male and female semen-the first and second principles of generation, as Hippocrates called them; women's semen has the power to generate but is weaker than men's; women's testicles are inside because they are cooler than men's and women have excess blood because their cooler bodies do not use nutrients as efficiently; men are hotter both because of a natural temperature difference and because of "the manner of their life and conditions of their work and exercise." (The body in this case reflects social arrangements rather than, as the two-sex model would have it, grounding them in biology.) At the end of the day, Du Laurens concludes that the sexes, in fact, do not differ "essentially" at all but only "per accidens"-that is, the temperatures of their bodies and the arrangements of their parts differ to suit men and women for their respective reproductive roles.
2 No one, as far as I know, has ever denied this; it is a very modest claim and stands in sharp opposition to the eighteenth-and nineteenth-century arguments that I quote at length to the effect that the bodies of men and women differ fundamentally and that on this foundation the order of gender is secured.
The editions of Du Laurens I consulted do not have illustrations, but Helkiah Crooke's Mikrokosmographia, a compendium of anatomical learning gathered mostly from Du Laurens and from Caspar Bauhin, whom Stolberg also cites, has them in abundance. From it we can get a sense of just how little minor revisions of the sort Stolberg musters actually mattered for how difference was represented. Figure 1 speaks for itself; on the questions of the relationship between male and female genitalia, it is straight out of Galen via Ve- salius. Even if Du Laurens and Bauhin had wanted to undermine the one-sex model with their anatomical observations-which in my view they did not-one of their bestinformed popularizers missed the point completely. Crooke is also happy to continue to draw his metaphors from the one-sex model on his own account. To be sure, he agrees, the vagina is not like the penis in all the respects Du Laurens points to. But that said, "the neck [of the womb] is turned out and it hangeth forth of the privities like a yard betwixt the thights." Note also that neither he nor Du Laurens uses specific technical terms to distinguish what we call the "vagina," "the neck of the womb," from what we call the "cervix," the "bottom of the womb"-which, incidentally, also on occasion "falleth into the lappe." Crooke repeats Du Laurens's points about the clitoris being different from the penis but adds that through it "the imagination is carried to the spermatical vessel by [its] motion and attrition," which is necessary because the testicles of the woman are so far from the yard of the man during intercourse. The lower ligaments of this, "the seat of delight" in women, also help in transmission to the female testicles. This is not exactly a physiology of "sexual dimorphism" avant la lettre. (I might also add that the illustrations [see Figure 2 ] in the anatomy of Juan de Valverde, whose views on bones supposedly undermine Schiebinger's views, are also resolutely Galenic, paradigmatic versions of the genital and, more broadly, reproductive anatomy as imagined in the "one-sex model."
3 )
The problem is not, as Stolberg supposes, to account for a sixteenth-and early seventeenth-century shift in how sexual difference was understood and how this understanding was mobilized for political and cultural purposes but quite the opposite: Why did the sorts of observations he adduces have almost no impact? (Good thing, too; because the explanations he gives for their supposed transformative power would not work.) There are at least four reasons. In the first place, even at their most minimal, Du Laurens's claims ran against common medical opinion. He was not being self-aggrandizing, I think, when he said that "the opinion of the ancients, confirmed by the authority of learned men and the writings of almost all anatomists," was that the "parts of generation in women differ from those of men only with respect to their position due to differences in temperature."
4 In other words, the Galenic isomorphisms were the common currency, and a serious attack on them would have meant more than making a few debating points about how three hollows could not be transformed into one.
But Du Laurens was not seriously interested in attacking the old model; he was engaged in skirmishes at its metaphysical periphery. Specifically, his argument was mounted against Aristotle's claim that the female body is a less perfect version of the male body, a failure of nature. Du Laurens is at pains to make clear that men and women differ only per accidens and not essentially-that is, not in their quiddity, in what defines them in the most fundamental way. Women, he wants to maintain, are not imperfect in kind; they are not nature's errors; they are simply adapted to their reproductive roles. Fine. But this relatively arcane philosophical question could be, and was, resolved philosophically without recourse to anatomy. As Crooke points out, Galen and many others besides held that woman was "perfect also in mankinde for Nature's imperfections are not so ordinary." Women were not failed men but perfect versions of what they needed to be to make nature
Figure 2. Whatever Juan de Valverde may have said about this or that part of female osteology, his representation of the vagina, uterus, and ovaries and their various vessels is straight out of Vesalius-who, in this case, follows Galen in emphasizing the isomorphism between the male and female reproductive systems. (Photograph courtesy of the Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.)
work. As for the isomorphism between the male and the female body, it is reasonable, he says, that the shape of the parts of men and women should be alike, as is their substance, because "they come from one and the same set of causes." All that Du Laurens wants in the text Stolberg cites is to win an argument about perfection; on the anatomical and physiological particulars-the parallel parts; the male and female semen, one more generative than the other; the necessity of orgasm and ejaculation in both sexes; the greater coolness of women; the surplus of blood in their bodies-he is squarely in the one-sex world. (The one big difference he has with most others is his skepticism about organs popping out of girls to make them boys, a minor sideline of the question of difference. 5 ) Third, much more than anatomy is at stake-and neither Du Laurens nor Renaissance medicine generally had any interest in unseating the physiology of the one-sex model. They continued to understand the body as constituted of more or less fungible fluids, as far more open, far less organically constrained than we have imagined it to be since the eighteenth century. Some academic doctors around 1600 did, as Stolberg says, come to see menstrual blood as good and healthy instead of harmful and poisonous. But this purported, and by no means general, change was not a blow for purposeful difference, complementarity, and adaptation of the body to its function. Whether good or corrupt, no one ever denied that having a surplus of blood was a sign of woman's role in childbearing, of available nutriments for the child in her womb.
What matters is that menstruation was not regarded, as it would be by the late eighteenth century, as an organically grounded physiological function unique to women, one that could be used as the reason behind this or that discrimination based on sex. It was something that bodies in general did, not something peculiarly linked to the female anatomy. Thus, for example, Juan de Quinones, a doctor in the court of Philip IV of Spain, argued in 1632 that Jewish men menstruated every month just like Jewish women-and for the same reason: to rid themselves of the impure, polluting blood that characterized Jews generally. Gerónimo de la Huarta, his contemporary, argued that menstruation was indeed the permanent condition of Jews, that their corrupt blood flowed regularly from the nether regions. In other words, these doctors appropriated a medieval tradition in which menstrual blood was dangerously impure and imported it into a new context. We might argue that this is the beginning of a biologically based anti-Semitism, something that distinguished pure Spaniards from impure Jews, but it is not part of the story of two sexes.
6 Quite the contrary.
But more generally the question of impurity is a sideshow. Male hemorrhoidal flux or bleeding of perfectly good blood from other orifices was also understood as a form of menstruation. "Our notion of menstruation as a specifically female trait," concludes Gianna Pomata, "stands in stark contrast" to the many "descriptions of menstruating men" she has found in the literature of the Renaissance. She uses this impressive body of evidence to argue against my view that the male body was always "the Gestalt, the paradigm that guided the perception of the female body." Her point is well taken. Just as the ovaries were conceived as female testicles, so, she continues, "could hemorrohoidal bleeding be perceived as a menstrual flow." In other words, the female could be understood as the paradigm and the male as the instance. But the point remains that difference was understood analogically and not grounded in radically different sexual bodies. Barbara Duden makes the same point on the basis of late seventeenth-and early eighteenth-century material: "the hemorrhoids and the menses were both seen as spontaneous evacuations of the body; they resembled each other and were interchangeable." The sort of anatomical revisions Stolberg cites gained little traction in the face of this worldview. Far from contributing to the creation of a new model of sexual difference, the history of menstruation in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries fits neatly into a one-sex model. Finally, I need not remind readers of this journal that scientific theories, much less worldviews, do not change because of a few facts that do not seem to fit. In the case of the one-sex model, anatomical discoveries for a time actually seemed to lend support. For example, the neck of the uterus-that is, the vagina-looks more-not less-like a penis without the nonexistent horns than with them. And major theoretical realignments do not occur simply because they favor a particular political or cultural view. Leaving aside the fact that we do not know how most anatomists felt about their wives, about the virtues of the incorporation of women into the household, about cheerier views of domesticity, and the like, no particular scientific view of difference necessarily favors one view of the place of women over another. Stolberg thinks that Schiebinger and I are right to emphasize "the potential cultural and political uses of sexual dimorphism as a means to legitimize female subordination and disempowerment as naturally given," but also that a more beneficent view of female empowerment in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries helps account for the triumph of the two-sex model in the first place. He cannot have it both ways although I can; I do not think that views about sexual difference neatly track ideology.
The anatomical observations of Du Laurens and the other anatomists Stolberg quotes did not fundamentally change the one-sex model because it was so well entrenched and so multiply supported and because they had no interest in unseating a whole worldview. Facts about difference did not, and do not, entail a one-or a two-sex model. What changed in the Enlightenment to produce the two-sex model was epistemology: biology as opposed to metaphysics became foundational. As cultural and political pressures on the gender systems mounted, a passionate and sustained interest in the anatomical and physiological dimorphism of the sexes was a response to the collapse of religion and metaphysics as the final authority for social arrangements. My quarrel with Michael Stolberg is not primarily about whether what I call the one-sex model collapsed 150 years earlier than I claim it did. Over the millennia, what is a century or two? I think I am right about the dating; we would have a great deal of evidence, literary and medical, that would be hard to accommodate if we went with his chronology. But it would not matter so much were it not for a larger question: whether the Renaissance and Reformation or the Age of Reason witnessed the triumph of a new reductionism, a new epistemology grounded in the natural world that produced a view of sexual difference in which the body was the final arbiter and not an imperfect sign, in which biology was said to entail gender roles rather than merely reflect them.
